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of the intermediate T-T− after the first C–C bond
breakage, T− after the second C–C cleavage, and
the final product of repaired base T. The various
dissections are shown in Fig. 3, D, F, and H, and
fig. S4. Thus, we obtained the ultrafast electron
hopping of FET3 in 6, 11, and 15 ps and the
electron return after repair in 437, 2890, and
819 ps for AnPL, DmPL, and AtPL, respectively.
Knowing the total QYs (Fig. 1C), we can also
derive the second C–C cleavage in 87, 48, and 36
ps and the futile back electron transfer BET2 in
1138, 149, and 527 ps, respectively, for three PLs
(table S1).
To recapitulate, we have identified 10 elemen-
tary steps in the repair reaction by DNA photo-
lyase, including 7 ET steps, and measured their
time scales in real time (table S1). Consequently,
we can calculate the QY of each step that con-
tributes to the total QY (table S2). In Fig. 4, A and
B, we show the two resolved photocycles for class
I AnPL and class II AtPL, respectively, with the
corresponding reaction times of each step. For
class I PL (Fig. 4A), the two systems we studied,
AnPL and EcPL, show a dominant tunneling
pathway with the highest QYs (table S2). For
class II PL (Fig. 4B), the two systems studied
here, DmPL and AtPL, adopt mainly a two-step
hopping route, also with good repair efficiency.
For other PLs [class III CcPL and ssDNA-specific
AtPL (AtCRY3)], both tunneling and hopping
channels are operative (table S1). These detailed
dynamics and time scales for seven ET reactions
involved in repair can be used to derive micro-
scopic pictures of various reorganization ener-
gies; their relevant reduction potentials; and,
thus, reaction driving forces (table S3) (21, 24, 25).
We did not observe clear evidence for the possible
flickering resonance for the initial electron bi-
furcation, as proposed recently in a theoretical
study (26).
Figure 4C shows the repair QYs along the
evolutionary path from the microbial class I to
the eukaryotic class II PLs, with initial electron
bifurcation into the tunneling route FET2 and
the hopping path FET1 and their resulting QYs
(QY2 and QY1). Clearly, the tunneling route in
class I leads to a higher repair QY. With the
decrease in the rates of tunneling, the hopping
channel comes to dominate in class II PLs. Con-
sequently, class II PLs can never reach the class I
repair QY because the electron path at Ade−
also bifurcates into the repair channel to the
CPD and the futile path back to the original
ground state, both of which share similar hop-
ping rates. The conserved active-site configura-
tion and the folded flavin structure that occur
as a result of evolution in the entire photolyase-
cryptochrome superfamily (11–15, 27–30) are essen-
tial to ensure a unified electron-transfer mechanism
through electron path bifurcation into two oper-
ative routes for all CPD photolyases.
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INFLUENZA
Role for migratory wild birds
in the global spread of avian
influenza H5N8
The Global Consortium for H5N8 and Related Influenza Viruses*†
Avian influenza viruses affect both poultry production and public health. A subtypeH5N8 (clade
2.3.4.4) virus, following an outbreak in poultry in South Korea in January 2014, rapidly spread
worldwide in 2014–2015. Our analysis of H5N8 viral sequences, epidemiological investigations,
waterfowl migration, and poultry trade showed that long-distance migratory birds can play
a major role in the global spread of avian influenza viruses. Further, we found that the
hemagglutinin of clade 2.3.4.4 virus was remarkably promiscuous, creating reassortants
with multiple neuraminidase subtypes. Improving our understanding of the circumpolar
circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory waterfowl will help to provide early warning
of threats from avian influenza to poultry, and potentially human, health.
I
n 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) virus of the subtype H5N8 caused
disease outbreaks in poultry in Asia, Europe,
and North America (1–3). Avian influenza
viruses are a threat both to global poultry
production and to public health; they have the
potential to cause severe disease in people and
to adapt to transmit efficiently in human pop-
ulations (4). This was the first time since 2005
that a single subtype of HPAI virus had spread
over such a large geographical area and the first
time that a Eurasian HPAI virus had spread to
North America. The rapid global spread of HPAI
H5N8 virus outbreaks raised the question of the
routes by which the virus had been transmitted.
The segment encoding for the hemagglutinin
(HA) surface protein of theHPAIH5N8 viruses is
a descendant of the HPAI H5N1 virus (A/Goose/
Guangdong/1/1996), first detected in China in
1996 (5). Since then, HPAI H5N1 viruses have
become endemic in poultry populations in sev-
eral countries. The H5 viruses have developed
new characteristics by mutation and by reassort-
ment with other avian influenza (AI) viruses, both
in poultry and inwild birds. In 2005–2006, HPAI
H5N1 spread from Asia to Europe, the Middle
East, andAfrica during the course of a fewmonths.
Although virus spread traditionally had been
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attributed to transport of infected poultry, in-
fectedpoultryproducts, orHPAI-virus–contaminated
materials, several observations in the 2005–2006
epidemic suggested that wild birds also might
have carried the virus to previously unaffected
areas (6).
A HPAIH5N8 virus with genes from viruses of
the influenza A (H5N1) A/Goose/Guangdong/1/
1996 lineage was first detected in birds at live
bird markets in China in 2010 (1). This HPAI
H5N8 virus was a reassortant virus with the HA
gene segment fromHPAI H5N1 virus and other
gene segments from multiple other AI viruses
circulating in eastern China (1) and is now cat-
egorized as HPAI H5 virus clade 2.3.4.4 (7). This
clade is unusually promiscuous and has been
found in combinationwith six different neuramin-
idase (NA) segments, and multiple H5Nx viruses
may be circulating at the same time and in the
same region (8, 9). The propensity of HPAI H5
virus clade 2.3.4.4 to formnovel subtypes capable
of rapid, global spread is a major concern.
HPAI H5N8 virus caused a large avian in-
fluenza outbreak in poultry in South Korea in
the winter of 2013–2014 and subsequently spread
to Japan, North America, and Europe, causing
outbreaks there between autumn 2014 and spring
2015 (table S1). However, it is not clear by which
routesHPAIH5N8 virus spread so rapidly around
the world. Although there have been reports on
parts of these outbreaks (1, 2, 10) and speculation
on possible routes of transmission (3), no com-
prehensive global analysis has yet been performed.
The goal of this study was to analyze the
available genetic, epidemiological, and ornitho-
logical data for evidence of the relative contribu-
tions from poultry trade and from wild bird
movements (3, 6) for the global spread of clade
2.3.4.4 during 2014–2015. For this purpose, we
performed phylogeographic analysis of HPAI
H5N8 viruses detected in wild birds and poultry
from this global outbreak. In addition, we ana-
lyzed migration patterns of wild birds found in-
fected with HPAI H5N8 virus, epidemiological
investigations of HPAI H5N8 virus outbreaks,
and poultry-trade records from countries where
HPAI H5N8 virus was reported (11).
Initial phylogenetic analysis was performed
using HA sequences from HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4
viruses of poultry and wild birds from around
the world between 2004 and 2015, including sub-
types H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6, and
H5N8. From 2004 to 2012, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses
were circulating predominantly in Eastern Asia
(China), with some transmission to Southeastern
Asia (Fig. 1 and fig. S1). During this period, trans-
mission involving domestic anseriformes (ducks
and geese) appears to dominate, although some
contribution from domestic galliformes (chick-
ens and turkeys) and short-distance migratory
wild birds (e.g., mallard ducks) is also evident
(Fig. 1). Unlike H5 segments from other clades,
which are mostly found as H5N1, the HPAI H5
segment of the clade 2.3.4.4 viruses reassorts
frequently, acquiring NA segments from cocir-
culating low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)
subtypes, including N5 (from 2006 to 2010), N2
(from 2008 to 2012), N8 (from 2010), and, more
recently, N6 (from 2013) (8). To indicate the host
species and regions inwhich the reassortments are
thought to have occurred, a reassortment measure
was calculated using the number of branches in
the posterior set of phylogenetic trees for which
the NA subtype changed while the host species
and region traits remained the same (normalized
by branch lengths). This measure suggests that
most of the observed reassortants were gen-
erated in domestic anseriformes (fig. S2), and
particularly domestic anseriformes in Eastern
Asia (China) within the time period 2004 to
2012 (fig. S3).
The time to the most recent common ancestor
(TMRCA) for the HA segment of all clade 2.3.4.4
HPAIH5N8 sequenceswas estimatedas June 2010
[95% highest posterior density (HPD), January
to October 2010]; the TMRCA for the correspond-
ing NA segments was similar (September 2010;
95%HPD, April to December 2010). Clade 2.3.4.4
HA H5N8 sequences were found in two sub-
clades (Fig. 1). The smaller and earlier subclade
(a in Fig. 1) contained the first sequenced 2.3.4.4
HPAI H5N8 virus [A/Duck/Jiangsu/k1203/2010
(H5N8)]. The larger and more recent subclade
(b in Fig. 1) contained sequences from outbreaks
in South Korea and other countries included in
this study and caused multiple HPAI outbreaks
in 2014 and 2015 globally. The TMRCAof subclade
b was September 2013 for both HA (95% HPD,
July to November 2013) and NA (95% HPD, May
toNovember 2013). Consistentwith earlier findings
(1, 10), the phylogeny indicates that HPAI H5N8
was introduced into South Korea by long-distance
migrant wild birds that acquired it from the pool
of HPAI H5 viruses circulating in domestic an-
seriformes in Eastern Asia (China), although we
formally cannot exclude the possibility that
HPAI H5 viruses were circulating in unsampled
locations (Fig. 1).
Distinct, well-supported clades were identified
in South Korea, likely originating in the trans-
mission ofHPAIH5N8 viruses from long-distance
migrants to other wild and domestic birds (10).
One clade (c inFig. 1)was ancestral to theEuropean
outbreak and another (d in Fig. 1) was ancestral
to theNorthAmerican outbreak. Again,we cannot
exclude the possibility that viruses from these
subclades were present in unsampled locations.
Moredetailed phylogenetic analyses, using only
clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HA sequences with location
coordinates (11), showed that the virus spread
along two main long-distance migration routes:
one from the east Asia coast/Korean peninsula,
north to the Arctic coast of the Eurasian con-
tinent, then west to Europe; and the other north
from the Korean peninsula, then east across the
Bering Strait, and south along the northwest
coast of theNorth American continent to Canada
and the United States (Fig. 2 and movie S1). The
reconstruction did not indicate any spread be-
tween Europe and North America. The TMRCA
for EuropeanHA segmentswasAugust 2014 (95%
HPD, July to October 2014), and September to
October2014 (95%HPD,August toNovember2014)
for the North American HA segments (table S2,
a and b). Similar results were found from anal-
ysis of the NA segments (table S2, c and d). There
were also four separate introductions into Japan,
the first estimated around February 2014 (ances-
tral date of single virus A/Chicken/Kumamoto/
1-7/2014), and then three more, all with TMRCAs
in October and November 2014. The sequences
from one Japanese introductionweremost closely
related to sequences from Taiwan and those from
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Fig. 1. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) time-scaled phylogenetic tree of multisubtype HA sequences
colored by subtype, region, and host-type traits.The clades marked a and b contain H5N8 sequences,
and c and d contain sequences from Europe andNorth America, respectively.The displayedMCC tree was
obtained from a posterior set of trees inferred using the Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis Sampling Trees
(BEAST) program (13) with the SRD06 nucleotide substitution model, uncorrelated relaxed clock model,
and constant population size tree prior.The branches are colored according to themost probable ancestral
trait, and ancestral traits were inferred by a symmetric (subtype and region) or asymmetric discrete trait
model (host-type) upon the posterior tree set (14). Host types are Dom-Ans (red), domestic anseriform
birds; Dom-Gal (green), domestic galliform birds;Wild-Long (blue), long-distancemigratory wild birds;
Wild-Short (purple), short-distance migratory wild birds.
RESEARCH | REPORTS
another introduction to the Russian (A/Wigeon/
Sakha/1/2014) and European sequences.
The phylogenetic data were also used to infer
the ancestral host categories of the most recent
common ancestor of the European and North
American outbreak sequences, thus providing
evidence for which host type had introduced
the viruses into those areas (Fig. 3, figs. S4 and
S5, and table S2). Themost likely ancestral host
category for the North American outbreak for
both HA and NA segments was long-distance
migrants (HA, 66%; NA, 84%). A similar result
was obtained for Europe (HA, 66%; NA, 70%).
Several wild bird species with known HPAI
H5N8 sequences were long-distance migrants
at different stages of their migratory cycle, de-
pending on time and place found (table S3): Five
of the nine species found in SouthKorea inwinter
2013–2014 were long-distance migrants at their
wintering sites or on spring migration. Both in
North America andEurope, two of the four species
found in winter 2014–2015 were long-distance
migrants at their wintering sites or on autumn
migration (11)(tables S4 and S5 and fig. S6).
The April 2014 HPAI H5N8 virus outbreak in
Japan had different characteristics from the later
outbreaks in North America and Europe. The
Japan outbreak was the only one that was con-
temporaneouswith the outbreak in South Korea,
and no wild birds were found positive for HPAI
H5N8 virus in Japan during that outbreak.
Qualitative analysis of data from outbreak in-
vestigations on affected poultry farms in North
America, Europe, and Japan (11) (table S6) showed
that the likelihood of virus introduction via con-
taminated water, feed, and poultry was negligible
(Germany). Furthermore, no links between the out-
breaks in one country and those in other countries
could be attributed to personnel contacts or
SCIENCE sciencemag.org 14 OCTOBER 2016 • VOL 354 ISSUE 6309 215
Fig. 2. Reconstruction of the transmission routes using phylogenetic data only from H5N8 HA sequences. At each time slice, the host-type and location
coordinates on the branches of the posterior set of phylogenetic trees are inferred and plotted as a cloud of points.The host type was inferred by discrete trait
model (as Fig. 1) (14), and the continuous location coordinates were inferred using a homogeneous Brownian motion diffusion model (15). The map projection
used is the azimuthal equal areas projection, centered on the North Pole, which is marked with a + sign. Color key as for Fig. 1; see also movie S1.
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trade of live animals, feed, or products of ani-
mal origin (Germany, Netherlands, United King-
dom, andHungary).Many affected poultry farms
were located in areas where wild waterfowl are
abundant (Germany, Netherlands, United King-
dom, Italy, and Canada). Direct contact with in-
fected wild birds (United States) or indirect
contact with materials (e.g., bedding material,
boots, andwheels of vehicles) contaminatedwith
wild-bird feces was considered the most likely
route of introduction into poultry holdings (United
States, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom,
and Italy). In some outbreaks, the source of in-
fection was unknown or inconclusive (Japan and
Hungary).
We reviewed data from the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
(12) for 2011 to 2013 on export and import of live
domestic ducks and chickens of affected coun-
tries to estimate the risk of spread of HPAI virus
from South Korea to other countries via the in-
ternational poultry trade (table S7). Data on the
export of live poultry from North Korea and
Mongolia, also in East Asia, were not available
from FAO. Although all countries (Japan, Canada,
United States, Germany, Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Italy, and Hungary) where HPAI H5N8
virus emerged between November 2014 and
February 2015 imported live chickens and live
domestic ducks in 2013, South Korea reported
the export of a low number of live chickens and
no export of live domestic ducks, although un-
reported cross-border trade cannot be excluded.
Nevertheless, based on these data, it seems un-
likely that international trade in live poultry
played a major role in the long-distance spread
of South Korean clade HPAI H5N8 virus in
2014–2015.
Our analysis, using four different sources of
data, indicates that themain routes of large-scale
geographical spread of HPAI H5N8 virus were
most probably via long-distance flights of infected
migratory wild birds, first in spring 2014 from
South Korea or other unsampled locations in the
region to northern breeding grounds and then
in autumn 2014 from these breeding grounds
alongmigration routes towintering sites in North
America and Europe.
Recognition of a likely role of wild birds in the
spread of HPAI reinforces the need to improve
biosecurity on poultry farms and to exclude wild
birds from the immediate vicinity of poultry farms.
Culling wild birds and draining or disinfecting
wetlands would not be effective because these
viruses disseminate on rapid time scales over
very large distances, making reactive interven-
tions of this kind impractical and ineffective, as
well as contravening commitments made by sig-
natory countries to the Convention onMigratory
Species and the Ramsar Convention onWetlands.
The potential role of wild birds in the circum-
polar circulation of influenza viruses does point to
the need to increase our knowledge about the
connectedness at the vast circumpolar (sub)arctic
breeding areas betweenmigratorywaterfowl pop-
ulations originating fromdifferentwintering areas.
Surveillance of waterfowl at the crossroads of mi-
gratory flyways towintering areas in Europe, Asia,
and North America would inform epidemiological
risk analysis and provide early warning of spe-
cific HPAI threats to poultry, and potentially
human, health.
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Fig. 3. Posterior distributions of TMRCA of HA sequences from Europe and North America with
H5N8 subtype only, including host-type reconstructions, based upon a posterior set of phyloge-
netic trees generated as in Fig. 1. Color key as for Fig. 1.
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How economic, humanitarian, and
religious concerns shape European
attitudes toward asylum seekers
Kirk Bansak,1,2* Jens Hainmueller,1,2,3*† Dominik Hangartner2,4*
What types of asylum seekers are Europeans willing to accept? We conducted a conjoint
experiment asking 18,000 eligible voters in 15 European countries to evaluate 180,000 profiles
of asylum seekers that randomly varied on nine attributes. Asylum seekers who have higher
employability, have more consistent asylum testimonies and severe vulnerabilities, and are
Christian rather than Muslim received the greatest public support.These results suggest that
public preferences over asylum seekers are shaped by sociotropic evaluations of their potential
economic contributions, humanitarian concerns about the deservingness of their claims,
and anti-Muslim bias.These preferences are similar across respondents of different ages,
education levels, incomes, andpolitical ideologies, aswell as across the surveyed countries.This
public consensus on what types of asylum seekers to accept has important implications for
theory and policy.
E
urope currently faces the largest refugee crisis
since the SecondWorldWar. In 2015, Europe
received ~1.3 million new asylum claims (1),
andmanymore people are expected to flee to
Europe as conflicts in the Middle East and
other regions linger on. The number of migrants
trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea
who have been reported missing or dead totaled
3771 in 2015 alone (2), and this number is likely to
be higher in 2016 as asylum seekers embark on
new and even more dangerous routes to Europe
after the implementation of the refugee deal be-
tween the European Union and Turkey (3).
Asmore andmore people flee war-torn countries
and persecution, refugee-receiving democracies
must confront a fundamental challenge: how to
honor international commitments—including treaties
like theUnitedNations 1951Refugee Convention—
to process asylum claims and provide shelter to
accepted refugees, while at the same time devel-
oping asylum policies that are supported by do-
mestic voters.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the ex-
posure of European countries to the asylum crisis
(Fig. 1). Whereas some countries, like Germany
and Sweden, process a large number of asylum
applications per capita, others, like the United
Kingdom and Czech Republic, share a compar-
atively small responsibility. Yet themigrant crisis
has been so severe that it has resulted in political
conflict and social tensionswidely across Europe,
including extreme right-wing parties mobilizing
citizens around asylum issues (4), frequent arson
attacks on asylum centers (5), and the partial
closing of Schengen borders.
As the crisis threatens national solidarity, the
social contract, and continental unity, European
policy-makers face increasing public pressure
to find policy solutions. Although public pref-
erences may not always directly translate into pol-
icies, a sizable political science literature has shown
that, in democratic countries, particularly salient
and high-profile public policies often respond
markedly to public opinion (6–8). In the context
of this study, a case in point is the recent “Brexit”
referendum in the United Kingdom inwhich the
public voted for the United Kingdom to exit the
European Union, a decision that has been attri-
buted to rising anti-immigrant backlash in the
United Kingdom (9). And whereas public opin-
ion is a crucial factor, a key problem for both
academic scholars and policy-makers alike is a
lack of knowledge as to why some native-born
citizens oppose and others support the welcom-
ing of particular asylum seekers.
A large literature has examined public attitudes
toward immigrants (10), ethnic minorities (11),
and Muslims (12, 13) in general, but far fewer
studies have looked at attitudes toward asylum
seekers (14–21). The latter studies have provided
important insights into the correlates of anti–
asylum seeker sentiment, but either they are limited
to particular countries or they rely on observational
data from standard survey questions that ask about
asylum seekers in general and do not use exper-
iments to differentiate between different types of
asylum seekers (22). Furthermore, they have most-
ly been conducted before the current asylum crisis.
There still exists very little systematic and experi-
mental evidence to inform the heated ongoing
political debates over asylum policies with the
voice of European voters. In particular, we lack a
comprehensive assessment that captures which
particular types of asylum seekers the European
public is willing to accept given the current crisis.
To provide such an assessment, we designed a
conjoint experiment and embedded it in a large-
scale online public opinion survey that we fielded
in 15 European countries (23). We used entropy
balancing (24) to reweight our sample data to
match the demographic margins from the pop-
ulations of each country. Details about the sam-
ple, design, and statistical analysis can be found in
the supplementary materials (SM) (25). All analy-
ses, except otherwise noted, were prespecified in
a preregistered analysis plan made available at
the Political Science Registered Studies Dataverse
(http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YUNKUL).
Conjoint experiments ask subjects to evaluate
hypothetical profiles with multiple, randomly va-
ried attributes and are widely used in marketing
and, increasingly, in other social science fields to
measure preferences and the relative importance
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Materials and Methods 
 
Sequence data 
Sequence data obtained from field isolates collected from domestic and wild birds 
were contributed by the partners from 16 member countries in the Global Consortium for 
H5N8 Avian Influenza Viruses. The data were curated into a Global Initiative on Sharing 
All Influenza Data (GISAID) workset to facilitate sharing between the partners. GISAID 
promotes the sharing of all influenza type virus sequences, related clinical and 
epidemiological data associated with human isolates, and geographic and species-specific 
data associated with avian and other animal isolates. The GISAID workset used here 
included the sequence data themselves as well as information on host species, date of 
isolation and location of isolation. Publically available background sequences from 
GISAID were also used, including other clade 2.3.4.4 sequences. The final data consisted 
of (i) 219 HA multiple subtype sequences from 2005-2015 (ii) 130 HA H5N8 sequences 
(2010-2015) and (iii) 84 NA H5N8 sequences (2010-2015); and each contained 
sequences from several global regions, as well as from wild and domestic avian hosts 
(Tables S8 and S9). 
 
Phylogenetic analysis 
Bayesian time-resolved phylogenetic trees were created using BEAST 1.8 (13). 
Several nucleotide, molecular clock and tree prior / effective population size models were 
evaluated on HA data using AICM in Tracer 1.6. The selected models were: the SRD06 
nucleotide substitution model (one HKY model for codon positions 1 and 2, and another 
HKY for codon position 3, both with site-site rate variation assuming 4 categories of rate 
variation taken from a gamma distribution, which allows site to site rate variation ranging 
from highly conserved to very variable sites), an uncorrelated relaxed clock with a log-
normal distribution, and a constant population size tree prior (for the large multiple 
subtype HA dataset), or skygrid flexible effective population size tree prior (for the H5N8 
only datasets) (16). Three independent MCMC chains for the HA and NA H5N8 only 
datasets were run, each chain consisted of 50,000,000 steps, was sampled every 5,000 
steps, and the first 10% of samples discarded as burn-in. For the multiple subtype data, 
four independent chains were run, the chain length was increased to 100,000,000 steps 
(and sampled every 10,000) and the first 20% of samples discarded as burn-in. For each 
dataset, the post-burn-in independent runs were combined, and then down sampled to 
create posterior tree sets containing 1000 trees. The above MCMC settings were chosen 
to achieve a post burn-in effective sample size of at least 200 in all parameters, as 
recommended on the BEAST website (17), and at least two independent runs were 
combined to mitigate non-convergence between runs, but in some cases we combined 
four independent runs in order to achieve the best effective sample size. 
 
Phylogenetic discrete and continuous traits models were inferred for each data set 
using the posterior tree sets as input and MCMC chain lengths of 11,000 steps with 
sampling every 1,000 steps. An asymmetric model was used for the Host discrete trait, 
and symmetric models were used for Subtype and Region discrete traits (the choices were 
made by comparing symmetric and asymmetric models using AICM in Tracer 1.6). To 
perform phylogeographic diffusion with continuous spatial coordinates using 
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homogeneous Brownian motion, the latitude and longitude of the sampling locations 
were first transformed into a north-pole map projection using equal azimuthal areas. The 
traits models were run independently over the posterior tree sets. Results from Host and 
continuous spatial coordinates models (H5N8 data sets), and Host, Subtype and Region 
(H5NX data set) were amalgamated (after discarding burn-in samples) for posterior tree 
sets containing 1000 trees, to obtain approximately 10 multiple trait mappings on each 
tree of the posterior set. In order to compare original to randomized trait reconstructions, 
Host and Region discrete trait labels were permuted (100 times for host only, and 10 
times for Host + Region) and run over the posterior tree sets containing 1000 trees. 
 
Using the posterior tree sets with Host, Subtype and Region (H5NX data set) 
discrete trait mappings, we identified branches where the (i) Host species and (ii) Host 
species and Region, were the same at the ancestral and child nodes.  To get a measure of 
where reassortment was occurring, for the identified branches, we calculated the 
normalized subtype changes per host (or per Host-Region) as the sum of the branch 
lengths for branches where the subtype changed divided by the sum of the branch lengths 
(of the identified branches).  Additionally, to examine the reassortments per Host-Region, 
we also calculated the normalized subtype changes for branches occurring before and 
after 2012 separately. 
 
Hosts were divided into the following categories: poultry were divided into 
domestic anseriform birds and domestic galliform birds; wild birds were divided into 
long-distance (listed in Table S4) and short-distance migratory birds (listed in Table S5). 
To test the effect of wild bird categorisation on phylogenetic analysis, wild birds were 
also examined as one group (Wild) or divided into two different groups, anseriforms 
(Wild-anseriform) and other species (Wild-other) (Table S2). Subtypes were HPAI 
viruses with the HA subtype 5 and NA subtypes 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, or 8. Regions were either 
individual countries (Japan or South Korea) or the following regions: Eastern Asia 
(China, East Russia, and Taiwan), Europe (Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and UK), North America (Canada and USA), or South Eastern Asia (Laos, 
Malaysia and Vietnam). South Korea and Japan were categorized individually because 
there were enough sequenced viruses to do so (>80 from South Korea, 12 from Japan) 
and because of our specific interest to evaluate the assumed sources of the viruses 
causing later outbreaks. Regional categorization was done after phylogenetic analysis, 
which was therefore not affected by the regional categories chosen. 
 
Epidemiological outbreak investigations 
After the HPAI H5N8 outbreak in South Korea, which started in January 2014, 
the virus was first detected in a chicken farm in Japan in April 2014. The origin of the 
infection was unknown or inconclusive, and Japan declared freedom from HPAI from 
July 2014 (18). Starting in November 2014, HPAI H5N8 virus again was detected in 
Japan, in faecal samples of tundra swans (Cygnus columbianus) and of unspecified wild 
ducks (Anatidae), as well as in tissues of individual sick or dead wild birds (white-naped 
crane [Grus vipio], hooded crane [Grus monacha], Mandarin duck [Aix galericulata], and 
mallard [Anas platyrhynchos]). In December 2014 and January 2015, several chicken 
farms (broiler, broiler breeder, layer) also were infected with HPAI H5N8 virus. Again, 
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the origin of the infection was unknown or inconclusive, and Japan declared freedom 
from HPAI from April 2015 (18). 
 
Between November 2014 and February 2015, HPAI H5N8 was detected in a total 
of 11 poultry farms (turkey, duck, chicken) and other holdings, as well as in a small 
number of wild waterfowl, in five European countries, as well as in two mute swans 
(Cygnus olor) in Sweden. In Germany, epidemiological outbreak investigations were 
performed to identify potential routes of entry via water, feed, animals, people, bedding 
material, other fomites (e.g., equipment and vehicles) and the presence of wild birds near 
affected holdings (12, 19–22).. Virus introduction via contaminated water, feed and 
poultry introduced into the farms was considered negligible in all cases, based on the 
retrospective, qualitative assessment of risk factors for the introduction of HPAIV H5N8 
by use of a template of the World Organisation for Animal Health for risk analysis . 
Furthermore, no links between the outbreaks in Germany and those in other countries 
were detected regarding person contacts or trade of live animals, feed, or products of 
animal origin. In contrast, the presence of wild birds near the affected holdings was the 
factor with the highest mean risk score. All outbreaks in Germany occurred in the north 
of the country, and all were in areas with an abundant presence of wild waterbirds. A few 
days before the outbreak in one of the three commercial poultry farms, large aggregations 
of bean geese (Anser fabalis) and greylag geese (Anser anser) were observed in 
surrounding pastures, and the ground around the poultry houses was notably 
contaminated with bird faeces. Considerable numbers of wild waterbirds also were 
observed in the vicinity of the other two commercial poultry farms. The highest risk of 
virus introduction into poultry farms was considered to be indirect contact with materials 
(e.g., bedding material, boots, wheels of vehicles) contaminated with wild bird faeces. 
Introduction via contaminated boots or bedding material on the two turkey farms is 
supported by the fact that turkeys in the poultry houses next to the entrances of the farms 
were the first to be affected, and by the identification of gaps in biosecurity measures. In 
the two small free-range holdings and the zoo, risk of introduction by direct contact with 
wild birds was considered high. 
 
In the Netherlands, all five affected poultry farms kept their animals indoors and 
were located in areas where wild waterfowl were abundant. Epidemiological outbreak 
investigations did not reveal possible dangerous contacts (e.g., professional visitors and 
transport of contaminated feed or bedding material) between the affected Dutch farms 
and affected farms in Germany, the U.K., or Asia, or between the affected Dutch farms 
themselves, except one possible farm-to-farm transmission. The most likely route of virus 
introduction was suggested to be persons wearing contaminated clothes or boots, carrying 
contaminated materials or feed, or by contaminated vermin or flies (23). 
 
The single affected poultry farm in the U.K. was located about 30 km north of the 
Humber Estuary, one of the most important wetland sites in the U.K., with up to 130,000 
wildfowl and waders making use of saltmarshes and mudflats during migration and 
overwintering. Epidemiological investigation showed no direct connections between 
affected holdings in the U.K., Germany and the Netherlands, or to the Far East. There 
was no evidence of direct introduction of HPAI H5N8 virus by purchased poultry, by 
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indirect contact with contaminated people or fomites, or by importation of infected 
products (e.g., feed) (24, 25). 
 
The single affected poultry farm in Italy was located in close proximity to 
wetlands and marshlands of the Po River Delta, which is one of the most populated 
wintering sites for migratory birds and wild waterfowl in Italy. Results of 
epidemiological investigation suggested that HPAI H5N8 virus may have been 
introduced into the farm by use of litter contaminated by infected wild birds where it was 
kept outside (26). 
 
The single affected farm in Hungary was located 30 km south of the 32,000 
hectare Hortobágyi National Park, where important numbers of many species of 
migratory waterbirds feed and rest (27). Results of epidemiological investigation 
indicated that there was no transport to the affected holding from outside Hungary, and 
the source of infection was unknown or inconclusive (28). 
 
Two out of ten mute swans found dead in central Stockholm, Sweden, were 
autopsied as part of general wildlife health surveillance and found positive for HPAI 
H5N8 virus. There are no commercial poultry farms in the near vicinity, and HPAI H5N8 
virus was not reported in any poultry farms in Sweden (29).  
 
Between November 2014 and July 2015, HPAI H5N8 and related HPAI H5N2 
and HPAI H5N1 outbreaks were detected in poultry farms and wild birds in western and 
central North America. In Canada, outbreaks occurred in poultry farms in British 
Columbia and Ontario, affecting a total of 324,504 birds (18). Field epidemiological data 
from the outbreaks in Canada were not available, but it was noted for one outbreak in 
Ontario that wild waterfowl was present around the barns beforehand, and that HPAI 
H5N8 virus was detected in a single American wigeon (18). In the USA, outbreaks 
occurred in poultry farms of 15 western and central states, affecting over 48 million birds 
(30), as well as a wide range of wild bird species, mainly ducks, geese, and raptors (30, 
31). Based on both epidemiological and virological analyses, direct or indirect contact 
with infected wild birds was considered to be responsible for initial introduction of HPAI 
H5N8 and related viruses into commercial poultry in the USA. However, insufficient 
application of biosecurity measures likely allowed the virus to subsequently spread 
between farms in other ways, such as sharing of equipment between infected and non-
infected farms, employees moving between infected and non-infected farms, lack of 
cleaning and disinfection of vehicles moving between farms, and the presence of rodents 
or small wild birds inside poultry houses. There also was evidence that virus was 
transmitted through air from infected to non-infected farms (30). 
 
Annual migration patterns of wild birds involved in HPAI H5N8 outbreaks 
The phylogenetic analyses indicate that migrating wild birds carried HPAI H5N8 
virus to North America and Europe in 2014/2015. Therefore, we reviewed the migratory 
patterns of wild birds found positive for HPAI H5N8 virus (Table S3, S4, S6 and Fig. 
S6). 
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Times and routes of migration are consistent with virus spread by migratory birds 
via their breeding grounds. The best supported scenario is as follows: in winter 
2013/2014, wild birds wintering in South Korea or possibly neighbouring unsampled 
regions became infected; during spring migration, they transported the virus to northern 
breeding grounds; in summer 2014, virus was maintained at northern breeding grounds 
by serial infection of wild birds and/or virus persistence in water, and spread to wild birds 
originating from other wintering areas; in autumn 2014, infected wild birds transported 
the virus to wintering areas in North America and Europe. This scenario fits with the 
synchronous detection of HPAI H5N8 or related viruses in these geographical areas in 
November 2014. 
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Fig. S1 (separate PDF file) 
Time scaled Bayesian phylogenetic tree of the 219 multiple subtype HA sequences, with 
sequence names and 95% highest posterior density confidence intervals for the internal 
node heights (time to most recent common ancestors). 
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Fig. S2                    
Number of NA-subtype changes with respect to HA trees per host type, normalised by 
branch lengths. The dark coloured densities are for the original data (10 reconstructions 
per tree, over 1000 trees), the pale colours are for trees with permuted host labels (10 per 
tree, over 1000 trees). The dots represent the median values and the boxes show the 
interquartile range. Host types are: Dom-ans (red): domestic anseriform birds, Dom-gal 
(green): domestic galliform birds, Wild-Long (blue): long-distance migratory wild birds, 
Wild-Short (purple): short-distance migratory wild birds. Numerical values of the 
descriptive statistics are provided in Table S10. 
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Fig. S3 
Number of NA-subtype changes with respect to HA trees per combined host type and 
region traits, normalised by branch lengths. The dark coloured densities are for the 
original data (10 reconstructions per tree, over 1000 trees), the pale colours are for trees 
with permuted host labels (10 per tree, over 1000 trees). The dots represent the median 
values and the boxes show the interquartile range. Color key as for Fig. S2. Numerical 
values of the descriptive statistics are provided in Table S10. 
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Fig . S4                       
Posterior distributions of time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of NA 
sequences from Europe and North America with H5N8 subtype only, including Host type 
reconstructions, based upon a posterior set of phylogenetic trees generated as in Fig 1. 
Color key as for Fig. S2. 
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Fig. S5 
Host reconstructions at the TMRCA for H5N8 European and H5N8 North American 
sequences (HA upper, NA lower), averaged over 1000 trees, showing original data (red 
diamonds, from the constant population size trees; blue diamonds, from the skygrid 
flexible population trees) and distribution of values from reconstructions using permuted 
host labels (100 per tree over 1000 skygrid flexible population trees, pale colors). The 
bars represent median values and the boxes show the interquartile range for the permuted 
data. Color key as for Fig. S2. 
  
12 
 
 
 
Fig. S6                   
Overview of possible migration routes of long-distance migratory wild water birds with 
clade 2.3.4.4. HPAIV H5Nx in 2014 and early 2015. The map projection used is the 
azimuthal equidistant projection, centered on the North Pole, which is marked with a + 
sign. Arrows indicate the main known migration routes of each bird species after (South 
Korea) or before (Europe and North-America) a HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4. H5Nx positive 
sample was collected in 2014. Dashed colored lines indicate the migration patterns of 
bird species of which certain populations of these birds are also sedentary (small circles). 
(Eurasian coot: blue, Baikal teal: red, bean goose: yellow, greater white-fronted goose: 
dark green, common teal: dark brown, tundra swan: purple, mallard: light green, Eurasian 
wigeon: dark pink, American green-winged teal: light blue, northern pintail: black, 
American wigeon: beige). The dark pink dot indicates the territory of Belaya Gora 
settlement in Sakha Republic (Russia), where clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV was detected in a 
sample collected from a Eurasian wigeon. Relevant flyways of waders/shorebirds are 
indicated with dashed light-grey lines. 
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Table S1.  
Global spread of clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV A(H5N8) and A(H5N2) viruses. 
 
Date of first 
report 
Geographical 
location 
Environment Host species Virus Reference 
May 2010 China Live bird market Domestic duck HPAIV H5N8 (32) 
January 2014 South Korea Poultry farms 
and wetlands 
Multiple domestic 
and wild birds 
HPAIV H5N8 (33) 
April 2014 Japan Poultry farm Chicken HPAIV H5N8 (34) 
September 2014 Sakha 
Republic 
Russia 
Wild bird Eurasian wigeon HPAIV H5N8 (35) 
September 2014 China Slaughterhouse 
and wetland of 
river 
Domestic duck and 
environmental 
sample 
HPAIV H5N8 (18) 
November 2014 Germany, 
Netherlands, 
U.K. 
Poultry farms 
and wild birds 
Chicken, duck, 
turkey 
HPAIV H5N8 [ (20, 24, 
36–38) 
November 2014 Canada Poultry farm Chicken, turkey HPAIV H5N2 (18, 39)  
November 2014 Japan Poultry farms 
and wild birds 
Chicken and wild 
birds 
HPAIV H5N8 (18)  
December 2014 Italy Poultry farm Turkey HPAIV H5N8 (38) 
December 2014 USA Backyard flock 
and wild birds 
Various HPAIV H5N8 
and H5N2 
(18)  
February 2015 Hungary Poultry farm Domestic duck HPAIV H5N8 (18) 
February 2015 Sweden Wild birds; 
central 
Stockholm 
Mute swan HPAIV H5N8 (29)  
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Table S2 (separate excel spread sheet file). 
Time to Most Recent Common Ancestors (TMRCA) with probability of inferred 
ancestral host-type (as percentage of trees with reconstructed host-type), overall 
transition rate between host-types (host clock rate), branch length between the most 
recent common ancestor and its ancestor, and number of expected host-type transitions 
along this branch  Each sub-table is repeated for HA and NA segments, constant 
population size and skygrid trees and for the 4-host-state model (domestic anseriform, 
domestic galliform, wild long-range migrants, wild short-range migrants), a 3-host-state 
model (domestic anseriform, domestic galliform, wild) and an alternative 4-host-state 
model (domestic anseriform, domestic galliform, wild anseriform, wild other). 
In addition, the corresponding relative transition rates between host-types for each model 
are provided. 
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Table S3.                
Overview of wild bird species in which clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV H5N8 with known 
sequence information were detected in 2014-early 2015. 
Branch Country Wild bird species Date of 
sample 
collection 
Stage IUCN status(40) 
European 
branch 
South Korea Eurasian coot (Fulica atra) Jan-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Baikal teal (Anas formosa) Jan-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) Feb-2014 sedentary/wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Goose (unknown species) -- unknown - 
 South Korea Common teal (Anas crecca) Mar-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Tundra swan (Cygnus 
columbianus) 
Feb-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Spot-billed duck (Anas 
poecilorhyncha) 
Feb-2014 wintering Least concern 
 Russia Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope) Sep-2014 breeding/autumn 
migration 
Least concern 
 Netherlands Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope) Nov-2014 wintering Least concern 
 Germany Common teal (Anas crecca) Nov-2014 autumn 
migration/wintering 
Least concern 
 Sweden Mute swan (Cygnus olor)  Feb-2015 sedentary Least concern 
 Germany Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) Jan-2015 wintering/sedentary Least concern 
North 
American 
branch 
South Korea Greater white-fronted goose 
(Anser albifrons) 
Jan-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) Jan-2014 wintering/sedentary Least concern 
 South Korea Bean goose (Anser fabalis) Feb-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Baikal teal (Anas formosa) Jan-2014 wintering Least concern 
 South Korea Common teal (Anas crecca) Mar-2014 spring migration Least concern 
 South Korea Spot-billed duck (Anas 
poecilorhyncha) 
Dec-2014 sedentary Least concern 
 South Korea Gadwall (Anas strepera) May-2014 sedentary or spring 
migration 
Least concern 
 Japan Hooded crane (Grus monacha) 
and White-naped crane (Grus 
vipio) 
Nov-2014 - 
Jan-2015 
wintering Vulnerable, 
vulnerable 
 USA (Washington) Gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus) Dec-2014 wintering Least concern 
 USA (Washington) American wigeon (Anas 
americana) 
Dec-2014 wintering Least concern 
 USA (Washington) Northern pintail (Anas acuta) Dec-2014 wintering/autumn 
migration 
Least concern 
 USA (Washington) Canada goose (Branta 
canadensis) 
Jan-2015 sedentary/wintering Least concern 
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Table S4.                    
Annual migration patterns of long-distance migratory wild bird species in which clade 
2.3.4.4 HPAIV H5N8 was detected. 
(1) When data about a particular population in an area were available, these data were 
analyzed. This is indicated with ‘population’. 
(2) Population has a very large range, different populations have different breeding and 
wintering locations, species can also change between flyways. 
(3) Populations in more temperate regions are sedentary.   
Region Species Analyzed data (1) Wintering area Period of migration 
to breeding area 
Breeding area Period of migration 
to wintering area 
Referenc
e 
East Asia Baikal teal 
(Anas formosa) 
Population Japan, South 
Korea and China 
Mid-March- early 
April 
Eastern Siberia September to 
November 
(41) 
East Asia Bean goose 
(Anser fabalis) 
Anser fabalis 
middendorfi and 
Anser fabalis 
serrirostris 
China, Korea, 
Japan 
Start nesting in early-
May to early-June 
Taiga zone located in 
eastern Siberia to 
Russian Far East 
September to 
October 
(42) 
East Asia Common teal 
(Anas crecca) 
Particular 
(sub)population, 
known to change 
between flyways 
(2) 
South Korea Late-February 
(peaking in March-
April) 
Eastern Russia October to 
November 
(43) 
East Asia Greater white 
fronted goose 
(Anser 
albifrons) 
Subspecies Eastern part of 
China, North and 
South Korea, 
Japan 
Start nesting in late 
May 
Arctic (subspecies A.a. 
frontalis: Arctic tundra 
from Lena delta east to 
Russian Far east 
Late August to late 
autumn 
(44) 
East Asia Tundra swan 
(Cygnus 
columbianus) 
Whole species East-Asia: east 
part of China, 
North and South 
Korea, Japan 
March-June Arctic September to 
October 
(45) 
Northwestern 
Europe 
Common teal 
(Anas crecca) 
Population Northwestern 
Europe 
Late February 
(peaking in March-
April) 
Fennoscandia, the 
Baltic states, northwest 
Russia, northern 
Poland, Germany and 
Denmark 
October to 
November 
(43, 46) 
Northwestern 
Europe 
Eurasian 
wigeon (Anas 
penelope) 
Population Northwestern 
Europe 
March-May Fennoscandia and 
European Russia 
September to 
November 
(46, 47) 
North America American 
wigeon (Anas 
americana) 
Whole species British Columbia 
in Canada, the 
near complete 
United States, 
Central America 
and the West 
Indies 
February-May Northern part of the 
USA, Alaska and 
Canada 
Late July- December (48, 49) 
North America Northern pintail 
(Anas acuta) 
Population British Columbia 
in Canada, the 
near complete 
United States, 
Central America 
and the West 
Indies 
Late February- May Northern part of the 
USA, Alaska and 
Canada 
Mid-August onwards (50, 51) 
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Table S5.                
Overview of annual migration patterns of wild bird species in which clade 2.3.4.4. 
HPAIV H5N8 was detected that migrate only over relatively short distances. 
Region Species Analyzed 
data (1) 
Comments References 
East Asia Eurasian coot 
(Fulica atra) 
Population Spring migration route and exact site of location in summer are unknown. They most 
probably stay during spring and summer in the mainland of east or northern Asia. 
(52) 
East Asia Gadwall (Anas 
strepera) 
Species Partly sedentary. Northern breeding populations fly to their breeding grounds in March-
April and to their wintering grounds in July-August. 
(53) 
East Asia Mallard (Anas 
platyrhynchos) 
Population Widely distributed. Northern breeding populations stay much further south in the winter. 
Populations of temperate regions are more sedentary. 
(46, 54) 
East Asia White-naped 
crane 
(Antigone 
vipio) 
Species Breeds in Dauria on the border of Russia, Mongolia and China, the Amur and Ussuri 
basins on the Sino-Russian border and the Songnen and Sanjiang plains, China. 
Migrates to its wintering grounds in the Yangtze basin, the Demilitarised Zone in North 
Korea/South Korea, and to southern Kyushu in Japan. 
(55) 
East Asia Hooded crane 
(Grus 
monacha) 
Species Breeds in south-central and south-eastern Siberia, Russia. Breeding is suspected in 
Mongolia and two breeding sites have recently been found in the region of Heilongjiang, 
China. Majority of the population winters in Japan, with smaller numbers in China and 
South Korea. 
(56) 
Northwestern Europe Mallard (Anas 
platyrhynchos) 
Population Partially migratory. Birds that breed in the northern part of Europe in general migratory, 
birds that breed in temperate regions are more sedentary. 
(46) 
Northwestern Europe Mute swan 
(Cygnus olor) 
Species Essentially sedentary, or only locally migratory. Exchange between the NW/Central 
European population and the Black Sea/Sea of Azov population. 
(57) 
North America Mallard (Anas 
platyrhynchos) 
Population Partially migratory. Birds that breed in the northern part are in general migratory, birds 
that breed in temperate regions are more sedentary 
(46) 
North America Gyrfalcon 
(Falco 
rusticolus) 
Population Breeds in the far north part of Canada and Alaska and comes south in the winter to 
Canada and the northern parts of the USA 
(58) 
North America Canada goose 
(Branta 
canadensis) 
Population Large range, breeding in Canada, Alaska and northern parts of the USA, wintering in 
North America and Mexico. Also resident populations present in the USA, which live 
south of the normal breeding range. 
(59) 
(1) When data about a particular population in an area were available, these data were 
analyzed. This is indicated with ‘population’.  
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Table S6.                
Overview of field epidemiological and sequence analysis data of outbreaks of HPAIV 
clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 among commercial poultry farms. 
Country Species 
and farm 
City Animals 
on farm 
Housing Field epidemiological data Sequence 
analysis data 
Reference 
Germany  fattening 
turkeys 
Heinrichswalde, 
Vorpommern-
Greifswald 
31,000 indoor Farm surrounded by fields and 
forest and with restricted 
access. Area with low poultry 
density, about 1.3 km east of a 
lake frequently visited by wild 
birds. All surrounding poultry 
holdings tested AIV negative. 
 No data related 
other German 
strains 
(19–21) 
 
Germany  fattening 
turkeys 
Barssel, district 
Cloppenburg 
19,200 indoor All poultry in surveillance zone 
tested AIV negative. Contact 
tracing: all negative. 
 No data related 
other German 
strains 
(19, 22)  
Germany  fattening 
ducks and 
few hens 
Neuborger, 
district Emsland 
about 
11,000 
indoor All poultry in surveillance zone 
tested AIV negative. Contact 
tracing: all negative. 
 No data related 
other German 
strains 
(19) 
Hungary fattening 
ducks 
Füzesgyarmat 22,000 indoor No poultry have been moved 
from the affected or contact 
holdings to EU member states 
or Third Countries. In the last 21 
days the only transport was to a 
slaughterhouse in Bekes 
country. No transport to the 
affected holding from outside 
Hungary 
 Only outbreak in 
this country 
(28) 
Italy 
 
fattening 
turkeys 
Porto Viro 35,000 indoor Farm located in close proximity 
to wetlands and marshlands, 
wintering site for migratory birds 
and wild waterfowl. 
 Only outbreak in 
this country 
(26) 
Japan (April 
2014) 
broiler 
chicken 
Kuma-gun, 
Kumamoto 
113,100 indoor No data.  (18) 
Japan 
(November 
2014-January 
2015 
chicken 
broiler 
breeders 
Nobeoka-shi, 
Miyazaki 
4,031 indoor No data.  (18) 
Japan 
(November 
2014-January 
2015 
chicken 
broilers 
Miyazaki-shi, 
Miyazaki 
42,030 indoor No data.  (18) 
Japan 
(November 
2014-January 
2015 
chicken 
broiler 
breeders 
Natato-shi, 
Yamaguchi 
33,017 indoor No data.  (18) 
Japan 
(November 
2014-January 
2015 
chicken 
broilers 
Arita-cho, 
Kumamoto 
72,908 indoor No data.  (18) 
Netherlands  laying hens Hekendorp 150,000 indoor  Farm situated next to a river and 
in the middle of peat land, with 
abundant presence of wild 
waterfowl. All samples collected 
in frame of the official control 
system tested AIV negative. 
Separate 
introduction 
(23) 
Netherlands  laying hens Ter Aar 43,000 indoor  Farm situated in an area with 
abundance presence of 
waterfowl. 
Separate 
introduction 
(23) 
Netherlands  pullet-
rearing 
Kamperveen 11,100 indoor Farm located on a stretch of 
farmland boarded by a lake and 
the Ijssel river. Large numbers 
of wild waterfowl were present. 
Separate 
introduction 
(23) 
Netherlands  meat 
ducks 
Kamperveen 15,000 indoor Farm located 550 m from the 
other farm of Kamperveen. 
Transmission 
between farms 
outbreak 3 > 
outbreak 4) 
(23) 
Netherlands  layer hens Zoeterwoude 29,000 indoor  No data available. Separate 
introduction 
(23) 
United 
Kingdom 
breeding 
ducks 
Nafferton, East 
Yorkshire 
6,000 indoor Contact tracing: all samples 
tested AIV negative. 
 Only outbreak in 
this country 
(24, 25)  
USA turkey Stanislaus 
County, California 
145,000 indoor No data available. No data (18) 
USA chickens 
and ducks 
Kings County, 
California 
114,000 indoor 
(chickens) 
 No data available.  No data (18) 
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Table S7.                      
Export and import of live domestic ducks and chickens from 2011 to 2013, in countries 
affected by HPAI H5N8 virus outbreaks in 2014 and 2015 using data available from the 
FAO (12). 
      Domestic ducks Chickens 
Region Country Year Export Import Export Import 
North America Canada 2013 1470
1
 121 5874 60652 
  
2012 1397 78 6066 53397 
 
  2011 972 134 6345 57099 
 
USA 2013 500 822 87015 5350 
  
2012 593 620 84803 5551 
    2011 901 82 80605 6020 
Europe Netherlands 2013 1177 3680 330181 274401 
  
2012 998 1892 297854 290786 
 
  2011 1 386 335475 296137 
 
Hungary 2013 1781 232 70031 18116 
  
2012 1070 272 41174 18648 
 
  2011 70 30 32194 12086 
 
UK 2013 163 51 18652 11549 
  
2012 316 235 27739 9235 
 
  2011 0 0 23922 13375 
 
Italy 2013 6 147 12435 9241 
 
 
2012 13 136 13728 8283 
 
  2011 0 51 15169 6054 
 
Germany 2013 992 816 270858 166356 
  
2012 979 1496 290584 184023 
    2011 476 218 254984 177549 
Asia China  2013 0 68 7168 9867 
  
2012 0 76 7360 9786 
 
  2011 0 77 7235 10173 
 
Taiwan 2013 0 9 0 298 
  
2012 0 0 0 236 
 
  2011 0 3 0 352 
 
Japan 2013 no data 5 0 557 
  
2012 no data 6 0 784 
 
  2011 no data 1000 0 772 
 
South Korea 2013 0 139 3 608 
  
2012 0 319 0 624 
    2011 0 1063 2 1036 
1
 x 1000 heads  
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Table S8.              
Host-type, subtype, and region distribution of sequence data sets. 
 
Trait Data Set H5NX HA 219 H5N8 HA 130 H5N8 NA 84 
  Number of sequences 219 130 84 
Host-
type 
Domestic anseriform 87 44 19 
Domestic galliform 71 30 14 
Wild long-range migrant 22 25 24 
Wild sedentary or short-range migrant 39 31 27 
Subtype H5N1 25 0 0 
H5N2 33 0 0 
H5N3 1 0 0 
H5N5 9 0 0 
H5N6 30 0 0 
H5N8 121 130 84 
Region East Asia 58 8 8 
Europe 17 16 16 
Japan 12 11 11 
Korea 79 80 34 
North America 33 15 15 
South East Asia 20 0 0 
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Table S9 (separate excel spread sheet file).          
Tables of HA and NA sequences used for phylogenetic analysis. These sequences consist 
of 219 HA multiple subtype sequences from 2005-2015, 130 HA H5N8 sequences from 
2010 to 2015 and 84 NA H5N8 sequences from 2010 to 2015. The tables contain the 
subtype, host-type, phlyogeographic region trait, assumed latitude and longitude, and also 
the accession numbers and submitter details from GISAID. We gratefully acknowledge 
all authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from GISAID’s 
EpiFlu™ Database on which this research is based, and those who have also submitted 
their sequences to Genbank. 
 
Table S10 (separate excel spread sheet file).             
Numerical values of the descriptive statistics for the number of NA-subtype changes with 
respect to HA trees per host type, normalised by branch lengths (Figure S2) and for the 
number of NA-subtype changes with respect to HA trees per combined host type and 
region traits, normalised by branch lengths (Figure S3).  
 
Movie S1 (separate mp4 file)               
Animation of Figure 2. Continuous trait phylogeographic reconstruction using 130 H5N8 
HA sequences coloured by host-type reconstruction. 
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